

Ex. #1075

Doc. No. 1383B(18)

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TOP SECRET

Copy of the Telegram of Ambassador OSHIMA to Foreign Minister MATSUOKA, dispatched on 20 May (T.N. Year is No. 567. missing) (1941?)

In connection with the rumor that you are going to America, I heard various rumors here concerning the problems of the negotiation between Japan and America. Although from the interview with KIBBENTROP on 5th May, I learned that it was not a mere rumor. Although I intended to go on without touching this matter, in view of the tendency of this matter, and considering the future of Japan and of the influence of the Tripartite Pact, I can not remain without some deep thoughts. As I believe that it is my duty to inform you of the opinion of the German staff and also of my frank opinion, I send the separate telegrams no. 568 and no. 569.

What I want to mention to you now is as follows:

You showed me the reason why you did not inform this matter to the Italian Ambassador in Germany two times recently. However, presently I have no intentions of sounding out the problem of the confidence in me or of my position towards the people during the present critical period when the whole of our nation should act upon the "Way of the Imperial Subjects" as its primary principle. Much less do I try to sound your opinion, for the practice and technique of diplomacy belong to your department.

But what I cannot understand is that you think it is unnecessary to have me report the opinions of the Staffs of Germany and Italy, when the Japanese-American Agreement which has a very delicate relation with the Tripartite Pact, is about to be concluded. Therefore, from the standpoint of my duty as an Ambassador to Germany, I could not keep silent, and I expressed my opinion frankly in the separate telegrams, although it might be unnecessary. I beg you to take these circumstances into consideration. (End)

Copy of the Telegram from Ambassador OSHIMA to
Foreign Minister MATSUOKA.
No. 568

1. On 3rd May Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP asked me to visit him. When I called on him I was informed about the telegram regarding the Japanese-American negotiation. He said that although the telegram was to be kept a secret from me and the Italian Ambassador, as a friend to me, he revealed it to me for my personal understanding, since the matter is extremely serious. He then showed me the draft regarding the agreement proposed by America on 16 April. The draft consisted of four articles. He (RIBBENTROP) confessed that he was quite at a loss to understand the real intention of the Japanese government, so I answered him that Japan was observing the Tripartite Pact as the basis of its diplomacy, as you (Foreign Minister MATSUOKA) had clearly stated on your previous visit to Germany. I further told him that, accordingly, there was no reason to conclude such a treaty between Japan and America contrary to the Tripartite Pact. Thus, I avoided being concerned in this matter.

2. But on 9th of May RIBBENTROP asked me to visit him again, and he showed me OTT's telegram of the draft of the intermediary answer of Japan to America and also the telegraphic record of the conference between you and OTT which was held on 6th of May. RIBBENTROP seemed to have understood the affair clearly from the frequent telegrams sent by OTT, and according to the said intermediate reply, it is supposed that Japan has consulted regarding the understanding with America to a considerable extent, and to tell you frankly, according to the informations that Germany has gathered, from various sources, there is a report that the proposal was made by Japan. Gathering from the conversation of Foreign Minister MATSUOKA and OTT, it seems to me that Foreign Minister MATSUOKA was compelled by a certain group to consent to it. Moreover, it is reported that Foreign Minister MATSUOKA during the course of that conference stated that Japan will participate in a Russo-German war, if it should breakout. When Foreign Minister MATSUOKA visited Germany recently, he said, as his personal opinion, that Japan was going to attack SINGAPORE, but it seems that you have changed your opinion.

I have some doubts as to the true intention of ROOSEVELT.

If you should become obliged to conclude this agreement in order to avoid the participation in a remotely possible war, the Tripartite Pact would in reality become meaningless even if it may be possible to hit upon some legal pretext. Moreover, I believe that in Japan's progress, she will lose the chance to establish her right for leadership in East Asia. After lengthy thoughts concerning this problem, I thought of the following two plans from the German viewpoint.

- (a) Plan to refuse the proposal of America.
- (b) Plan to conclude the Japanese-American agreement under the condition that America maintain a neutral attitude without extending 'convoy' patrol lines.

RIBBENTROP asked my (Ambassador OSHIMA) opinion, saying that he wished to report plan (a) to the Fuhrer as he believed it to be a good one. Therefore, although I did not receive any instruction, I conjectured the intention of the Japanese government from common sense, and as my personal opinion, insisted upon plan (b) explaining that (b) would be much more advantageous to Germany. The reasons that I explained to RIBBENTROP were as follows:

If plan (b) are adopted, Germany will be able to fight a single combat against Britain and terminate the war in a short time. Again, although it might be wishful thinking, perhaps the "ROOSEVELT faction" may recognize the fact that America's assistance to Britain would be useless, and would make it a reason to alleviate America's assistance to Britain.

Even in case of its failure, it is useful at least for ascertaining ROOSEVELT's actual intentions concerning the assistance to Britain. Thirdly, it will enable those Japanese who want the cooperation with America to realize its impossibility. However, RIBBENTROP said that America would utilize this negotiation to estrange Japan from Germany, as long as this negotiation continued, and he repeated the same thing in telegram no. 545 (dispatched to TURKEY, no. 11). He further stated that it is possible for America to utilize it as propaganda material to convince the anti-war faction in America that America could now advance to the Atlantic Ocean because of the elimination of apprehension in Pacific area, and consequently the situation would become very dangerous to Germany. Therefore, he did not agree with my opinion, and said that at any rate this problem has not yet been decided by the Fuhrer, so he wanted

to send a telegram on the evening of the same day to the Führer, who was out of BERLIN, for a decision. At the same time, he wished to report my opinion to the Führer. Then I asked him whether or not he had consulted with Italy already. To my question, he answered that Italy has already received all the reports from Ambassador INDERLI, but he had not yet consulted directly with the Italian government, but that as soon as he received the decision of the Führer, he wished to send the telegram to OTT so that he might consult Italy.

2. As I made a promise to Prime Minister MUSSOLINI to visit him at the beginning of this month, I started for ROME on the night of the 10th. On the morning of the 12th, Minister BISMARCK visited me, and by orders of RIBBENTROP, he showed me the telegraphic instructions to OTT and added that the Italian government had the same opinion as Germany. After I read that instruction, I recognized that the Führer had made a different decision from that of RIBBENTROP. In the afternoon of 13th, RIBBENTROP flew unexpectedly to ROME and met MUSSOLINI and CIANO on the same day, and asked me to visit him on the morning of the 14th. When I went to see him, he showed me the telegram from OTT concerning the interview on the 12th, between you (Foreign Minister MATSUOKA) and the two Ambassadors of Germany and Italy in Tokyo. He expressed deep discontentment at your statement that you had been in a position where you were compelled to commence with the negotiation with America and that because of internal reasons, you were unable to await the arrival of opinions from Germany and Italy. He asked reproachfully why couldn't you await the telegraphic instructions when they were sure to arrive in several days. I told him that although I was not aware of the circumstances, I guessed that Japan was compelled to take such a measure because of the following reasons: It was necessary for Japan to conclude the agreement as soon as possible to maintain secrecy, and in Japan such important negotiations as this must be privately reported to the Emperor. I added that I believed that the agreement was not made out of inconsideration to Germany and Italy. RIBBENTROP, however, would not readily accept my words. He said that when you (Foreign Minister MATSUOKA) visited Germany, he met you (MATSUOKA) many times but he did not hear anything substantial concerning the Japanese-American agreement which is closely related to the Tripartite Pact. He said that it came as a great surprise to him when he received such a report soon after you (Foreign Minister MATSUOKA) returned to Japan. He continued that frankly he was much afraid that the agreement might make the Tripartite Pact automatically meaningless. He also said that as he

(RIBBENTROP) had remarked the other day, he did not believe ROOSEVELT from the very beginning, and that although his opinion was to advise Japan to refuse the American proposal he had to send a telegraphic instruction contrary to his own opinion. Hearing that I told him that it was a great pity to have a misunderstanding between Japan and Germany concerning this matter, so I gave advice to him that it was very necessary to inform OTT of his opinion, to make the facts clear and certain. When I visited Foreign Minister CIANO on the evening of the same day, it seemed that an interview had already taken place between RIBBENTROP, MUSSOLINI and CIANO, since CIANO expressed the same opinion as RIBBENTROP.

3. No sooner did I return to BERLIN on May 17th, than I was asked by Vice Minister WEISEGGER to visit him. When I called on him, he, by the telegraphic order of RIBBENTROP at FUSSELL, showed me a draft of Japan's answer to America which was telegraphed by OTT on the 14th, and the draft of the instruction of the German government to OTT concerning Japan's answer to America. He (WEISEGGER) said that as he received the order only to show me (Ambassador OSHIMA) the telegram, he will not express any opinion, but that in view of the present political situation, the German government had a deep concern about the result of this problem. He added that the German government attached great importance to Foreign Minister MATSUOKA's statement to OTT to the effect that Japan would attack the U.S.S.R. in case of a Russo-German war. He (WEISEGGER) then asked me whether or not Foreign Minister MATSUOKA understood the true state of affairs between Germany and Russia when he returned from his stay in Germany. I told him that I did not know what the Foreign Minister had revealed concerning Japan's attitude toward a Russo-German war, but that in Japan, such an important matter as this should be decided by the Emperor, and that probably Foreign Minister MATSUOKA must have expressed his personal opinion. I further added that since the Foreign Minister had many interviews with Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP during his stay in Germany I had no doubt that you (MATSUOKA) were aware of the real relationship between Germany and Soviet Russia.

(End)

Telegram No. 569 sent by Ambassador OSHIMA to Foreign Minister MATSUOKA.

1. As I reported in the separate telegram, the German government has a deep dissatisfaction concerning the problem of the Japanese-American agreement, and has much apprehension about the future of the Tripartite Pact. Since America is actually participating in the war, if Japan, ignoring the present circumstances, should conclude an agreement with America, it would be very natural for Germany to suspect that Japan is trying to check America's participation in the war, and at the same time trying to avoid her own obligation of participating in the war. When you came to Germany, all the people in Germany heartily welcomed you, and delighted in the strengthening of the 'Axis'. Since this is directly after that occasion, the feeling that Germany was betrayed is very strong.

2. I am well aware of Japan's desire to solve the China Incident as soon as possible in order to have time to spare for politics, economy and other fields. However, the European war is developing very favourably for Germany and Italy. In a few months, very important developments are expected, and if at this time Japan should lose the confidence and trust of Germany and Italy who will become the leaders in Europe, simply for an immediate profit, it is very unfavourable. Needless to say, America seems to have proposed the agreement as a temporary measure for estranging Japan from the Tripartite Alliance. I am afraid that such a two-faced diplomacy should lead Japan to an absolute international isolation during the critical period which may arise after the war.

3. Aside from the point that if Japan solves the China Incident with the support of America, she will leave an uneradicated root of future calamity, I express my apprehension that should Japan lose this opportunity to expand southward and the possibility of attacking SINGAPORE at random, she will invite the contempt of not only America and Britain, but also those of Germany and Italy. And, should America, taking advantage of the elimination of fear in the Pacific area, reinforce her assistance to Britain, the development of the European War would greatly be affected although America may avoid nominal participation in the war. Subsequently, Japan may suffer from some unexpected calamity. Moreover, should Japan abandon her right to leadership in the Southern regions for the sake of America, it is clear that Japan cannot stress the leadership to Germany and Italy.

This will mean that Japan abandoned her great mission to establish a new order in the Greater East Asia.

4. Last autumn, Japan concluded the Tripartite Pact, and the road our people should follow was made clear. But, if Japan should conclude the Japanese-American Agreement now, our people in Japan would be bewildered as to which path they should follow. Moreover, our friendly countries will despise Japan and will not trust Japan any longer. Subsequently, Japan will fall into international isolation, and will gain nothing. Therefore, I hope earnestly that the Japanese Government will embody the following two points, if the conclusion of the agreement is unavoidable:

- (a) As conditions to the conclusion of the Japanese-American agreement, it is absolutely necessary for Japan that she should make use of her situation over America, and establish the idea of the Tripartite Pact, by upholding the principle that Japan is to facilitate the battle of Germany and Italy against Britain. Again, Japan should demand America's neutrality in the European war, and at the same time, make clear that Japan has an obligation to participate in the war, based upon the Tripartite Pact. If America does not accept our proposal, Japan must not conclude the agreement.
- (b) It is most unfavourable for Japan to give the impression to Germany and Italy that the Japanese government is compelled to conclude the agreement on account of the increasing influence of a party in Japan that wants status quo. The conclusion of the Japanese-American agreement will only make Germany and Italy increasingly suspect that Japan took this action in order to avoid the obligation to participate in the war. Therefore, concerning the Japanese-American negotiation, Japan has to exchange frank opinions with Germany and Italy, and must thoroughly convince Germany and Italy about the purport of article (a).

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五月二十一日大島大使發松岡大臣宛電報寫

第五六七号

日本在華問題付テ貴大臣、渡米說上關聯、當地於種々、鳳說ヲ耳ニシ居リ。方五月廿四外相ト會談ニ依、右カ單な鳳說ニアサルコト承知。之モ貴大臣、實圖ヲ付度シ本使上シテ、本件ニ干渉セサば違前テ進アリ。存セカ本件、推移ヲ見テ本使、帝國、前述三國條約、夥鄉者考深慮。堪サルモノリ。独逸首脣部竟向並卑見ノ事有。貴大臣ニ被遞合ハ本使、嘗義務ナル信別電第五六八号及五六九号、通宣傳入。

尚此、餘併セ申上度ハ最近兩回二事。本件ヲ在独伊大使通報セラル理由ヲ示サシタル本使ハ現下、重大時局於万民正道實踐ヲ當ト化ト信託問題ト國民立場トガ詮索セント化カ如其意起毫末え。況シヤ外交實

施及技術ハ貴大臣、主官下セラレ居ル所ナリ於テオヤ唯本使、理解心得サハ三國條約極今機微關係ニ在。日本協定ヲ結シテセラル、當リ本使等ヨリテ独伊首脣部意嚮ヲ報告セム。要ナシトセラレアル。從別電亦蛇足感。然本使駐独大使、任ニ在ル限、職責上默スル能ハ。盧心懇懃ニ所信ヲ述ヘルモノナル。諒セラク乞了。

N61

五月二十一日大島大使發松岡大臣宛電報寫

第五六八号

一五月三日ノ外相ハ本使、未訪ヲ承メ本日オソトヨリ日本

N.2

Doc / J383B(1A)

交渉二閣入電報、本件八貴大使及在伊大使
知ササルコトニナリト、趣ニ付貴大使ニ申シ得ル筋アリ
此モ何分事極メテ重大ナルヲ以テ友人トシテ貴大使ニ被匿
不能ス、貴大使個人、令官ニ迄ニ申シ九次ナラリ以テ
右仰承シテリタント四月六日米國提案協定案
骨子四條電報ヲ示シ自命リハ突然日本ヨリ斯ル提
案ヲ受ク、實貝日本政府、首肯意ヲ知ルニ苦シニアル旨述
タルニ付本使先般松園外相訪獨、深判然述ニテ花姫
ノ日本三國條約外交、基調ト為シテ以テ日本間ニ
之ニ指馳入カ如キ約束ヲ結シ故ナリ答ヘ本件二閣係合
避匿事ナリ

二、五月九日更ニリハ本使、未訪テ來メテオソシヨリ電報
アリタル米國ニ對し日本、中間回答案並ニ五月六日於ル
貴大臣トオソシテ、會議記錄電報ヲ示シテ、屢次不正
電ヨリ明カトナリ、力右中間回答ニ依レハ日本既ニ東同
題ニ向シ相當米國下深入、此協議ヲ為シテ失ト察セ
リ又打明テ申上乞ハ独逸、今日迄諸方面ヨリ接取
セル情報中ハ本件ハ日本ヨリ提案セリト多セモ、
了又松園外相、オソシニ對ス才諾ヨリ察スル=松園外相
力或一派ニ引摺、シ己ヨリ得ス之ニ同意セルカ如ク見テ猶又
該會議中松園外相ハ拙シ誠率起ラハ日本ノニ參加
不ニ至ルハキコトヲ述ヘラシタルカ松園外相先般來独、察
松見テ承リタル新嘉坡攻撃ヲ行シトスル御意見ハ

全ノ御改三十九化モト考ハル
 予ハ心入ハル、此其意ヲ疑フセシテ若シ此等ニ參セリ又
 萬一場合ニ於ク參謀義務ヲ回避スル為本協定ヲ解消
 セラルコト、モナハ法理上何干天理窟ヲ有シ得ル事實上
 三國條約八骨板キト十九ノア入日本前途ニ執リテモトモ
 取扱ニ關シ熟慮、結果独逸側意見トテ次二案考ヘ
 ノリ

(1) 米國提舉不拒否セラル案

(2) 米國カノコボレ哨戒船形張等行入貿易中立、能
 度ヲ保持スルコトヲ條件シテ日本協定ヲ結ノ案
 自分ハ(1)案ヲ向信之ヲ總統ニ具申シテ存否
 貴見如何向ヒ名化シテ本使、何等割合ニ接シ居テモ
 常識的ニ帝國政府、意圖ヲ忖度シ本使、私見上シテ
 二村シ(2)案ヲ有利ト不ヲ主張シ之ヲ理由シテ若シ該案
 成立セハ独逸ハ英國上騎打ヲ得シ得村英威渾然結
 ト速カナルムヲ得ハシ入之ハ虫良考万力モ知ルモ
 或ハスハスハル一派對英援助無效ナリ知リ之ヲ
 和セント企理由ニ利用在場合元全然ナシト考エ入
 不成立、場合ニ於テモ少トモハスハル、對英援助ニ關ハル
 真意ヲ確得利益入ノア我國內ニ於テ日本協調、
 考アル者ニモ其、不可能ナコトヲ納得セシメ得ハシ上述ノ
 然ニハ自分ハ本支那ヲ總領化開米國ハ之ヲ日撫離
 間ニ利用入シトテ往電第五四五号(土耳其宛オーロ)件
 ラ述ヘ入米國内ニ於テ非戰派ニ村不說得材料ニ利用
 之ヲ以テ太平洋既ニ配ナカガ故ニ大西洋ニ進出シ可

No. 4

Doc / 383B(18)

ナリ云々、該ニ危險ナリト述、本使、意見ニ賛成也、免毛白事件、
未だ、上級流義源、艦船ノ以テ今後軍泊外在北洋下、電報
シ某裁決當事者、入會其際貴大使、意見ニ併セ述、シト合
ハル、今夕、依テ本使、伊太利側ハ既ニ協議セリタリヤト同
未夕直接伊太利ト協議アフスヒ、裁決アリ次オ
オソシニ付スル訓電ヲ起草スルヲシテ之ニ依リ伊太利ト
協議不若ナリト答ヘタリ、
二、本使、既ニ本月初ニ首相訪向、約ナリ居リ十日於發
命ナリトテオソシニ付スル訓電ヲ示スル是ニ伊太利政府モ
之上、同意見ナル旨述、乞カ該署ヲ讀ムニシテ奥義方
ナリ、意見ニ及シタル裁決ヲ知リ、然ニ十三日午前、公矣
然リ、一報未シ同日、モナリト會見シ十四日午前、本使
來訪、未タリ依テ彼ヲ往訪セル、百東京ニ於ケル
貴大臣ト獨伊大使、會見ニ及ス、オソシニ電報示シ
貴大臣カ内政、關係上獨伊、意見到着ヲ待ツ能ハズ
米國ニ付シ文書ヲ開始セサル、ハクサル事情ニ在ルトヲ述
ヘタリトテ大臣不滿、表シ僅力數日間待テハ、獨伊、訓電
到着スヘキ事、何故之ヲ待テ得サリヤトニハラシテ
本使全然其一事實、知ニサルヲ以テ何モ申上ケラニサモ被
密保持、關係上速ニ之ヲ解決不必要アリ日本ニ於テ、
此種重要交渉ハ陛下ニ内奏申上ノ關係モアリ、或
此等、理由ニヨリ乙ケラ得サル、出テタルナリト相像不ズ
独伊ニ付スル不親切ニ非サルコトハ確信不適ヘタリ

No.5

Doc / 383 B (A)

茲ハ「八密易ニ納得セ入宋八松園外相訪核、深度ニ
面接セル。三國條約ニ密接ナリ關係凡日米協定ニ關
何等具體的、御詔三十ノ松園外相歸朝早々斯、如キ
通知ニ接セル。實是意外ニ感シ唐忻浙ニテ率直三申乞
八自分ハ「八三國條約ニ向テ總經ヲ致スモノ痛々要
廣之處」先日正申上々夕比如ク自分ハ「始合ハ
ト不立上ト信セ入日本ニ米國、促案拒絕ヲ即勸
セントス化意見ナリハ自分、於上達ヒタル案ヲ訓覽之
ト、ナリタリ上述述ハ「以テ本件ニ關シ日俄兩國政府
間ニ於テ誤解起ハ最モ心ハキコト在ラムニテ懸念ハ
オシト」訓令セラレ十二令ニ却確ニナルコト極メテ緊要ニ
繰回シ注意シ置ケル。同夕ハ「外相ヲ訪問セル既ニ
カ」乃ク「上諭合ハルニテアリ」上同様意見ヲ
洩セル。

三、五月十七日本使歸伯入ヤナカニ、セツカ一資官來
ヨリ往訪セル。ハ在テ「シテ」、電命ニ依ルト
十四日附オシテ来電日本、村木回答蘇北ニ之ニ基ニテ
二科公獨逸政府、訓令來ヲ提示シ自分ハ「貴大使
ニ電文、提示入キ訓令ヲ受ケル」ミナルヲ以テ何等意見
述ハト入ルニサルモ特ニ現在、改局上獨逸政府ハ本件問題
成行ニ深キ關心ヲ有シアルコト述ヘテ松園外相ノ若ニ猶豫
開戰セハ日本ハ「聯邦ヲ攻撃奉入キコトヲオシト」ニ述ヘ
乙タニハ「極乙」之ヲ重要視シテ、外相ハ帶獨中独

16.6

Doc 1383B (8)

蘇關係、眞相ヲ了解シテ停合シタルヤト向ヘルヲ以テ本使
ハ猶蘇南戰隊日本、轉ルキ能度ニ閣外相力何
ト云ハシカハ知サセトモ斯カラ重大化事柄公餘國ニ於テ、
堅断ニ俟ツキモナハズラク外相公私見ヲ述ヘタニモ、
尤ヘク又外相公滯紹中度ニ」外相トモ會見セキニ
付猶蘇關係、眞相ヲ知ルアコトヲ疑ハタ答(署名)

一 大島大使發松園大臣犯ナ五六九号電報
「日米協定問題ニ關し獨逸側ニ於テ深刻尤不滿ヲ
有シ三國條約前途ニ關シ多大、危惧ノ有シ居ルト
電、如レ蓋シ米國既一事實上參戰ニ居ル今日
其現狀ヲ然過シ日米間ニ於テ協定ヲ結ハ恰ニ
日本ハ米國、參戰ヲ阻止之件セテ自國參戰義務
ヲ回避セモナリト、疑惑抱ハ独逸トシテハ乙ウ得ル
竹内ハク株式会社貴大臣、叶未獨ニ降ニ獨乙朝鮮
與ナシ歓迎、意表之起軸強化ヲ詠歌シル直ナ
尤大独乙上シテ裏切ヒタリ、威強、ノ居ル次第ナリ
ニ帝國力支那事變、遂に解決圖、政治經濟若般
餘猶不得下化必要、本使下ニモ了解不竹内ト
雖モ今ヤ歐洲戰爭、益々獨伊ニ有利ニ進展ニ此處數
日、仲ニ重化大變、豫測セリ居際目前、利益
為ニ歐洲ニ於テ指導的地位ヲ確保ハナリ独伊不信
ヲ招ク下果シテ每當ナリヤ多大、疑問ナリ。況シ米國
提案ハ單ニ日本ヲ三國同盟ヨリ切離サト心一時的、

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No. 7

第三謀過半心懼解カナル於丁才ヤ本使スル
如ナ而面外友ハ戰後未ハ重大危局ニ於ニ帝國ヲ
完全ナ國際的孤立ニ陷リシルモナコトヲ惧ル
三更ニ米國、口添ニ依リ支那事變、解以テ討ヒカ
將未ニ關ニ重大心禍根残企ノ久、矣、暫ク措毛
此、逸好、機會ニ南方經略ヲ拠葉シ況ニヤ何時ニ及
新吉坡ヲ攻略シ得ヒト、見込入、失カ如キ八軍ニ
莫米、ナラス猶伊、輕侮ト招キニアラサルヤ而幸
今後米國ニシテ太平洋ニ於ケル後顧無憂ナコトヲ
良キ上ニ名義上參戰避ケリ、付英援助強化化カ
如キ場合ニ於ケル改洲戰局、發展ニ影都督不折勢
カナルハノ高國ニシテ不測、害生立コトキテ保セ入
尚米國ニ付シ大東亜包合セルハ南方地域ニ付入我
指導權ヲ拠葉スルニ於ケル猶伊ニシテ之ヲ主張シテ
能ハム明カニシテ大東亜新秩序建設ニ開スル我大使命
ヲ拠葉シタルモト古ハナカニカズ
四、昨秋三國條約締結ニ依リ國民、向ノ所明カナルハ
今入日米協定ヲ結^ル於ケル内國民、其の歸趣速
ハシ外友邦、不信ト輕侮ト招キ實利ヨリ又國
際的孤立ニ招キスルニ過サルコトヲ此次第在帝
國政府ニ於ケル協定締結乙巳不得下セルニ付テナ
十七立、二件宣示ヲ切連入

三(イ)日米協定ヲ締結スルハ日本ノ米國ニ付入地位利潤
三國條約精神ヲ拠充シ猶伊、付英作戦ヲ容助ナ
シハルニナリ、主義ヲ確立シ米國ニ付シ歐洲戰爭ニ
關シ眞中立を要求スル是ニ三國條約ニ基、然參戰

16.8

Doc 138JB(18)

義務ヲ明カフハルニト色灯ニ必要ナリト存ス、而シテ米國ニシテ之ノ容ニサレハ協定ノ締結入カラス
(四) 独伊ヲシテ本件ヲ以テ日本ニ於心現狀維持派力勢力ヲ得未ハ爲己ムヨ得ス、本協定ヲ締結ノモノト、仰多數抱カムルノ上最云我ニ不利ニシテ右ハ独伊ヲシテ日本ハ參戰回避ノ念ヨリ此聲ニ出于タリト、深感ヲ深カラシム、二十ニ依リ日本太浩ニ付テ、独伊ト、獨意ナキ意見、文換ヲ行ヒ、趣旨ヲ独伊ニ徹底セムル必至ルヘン。

Minister } submitted separately
Vice-Minister)
Chief of AMERICA Bureau
Chief of EUROPE-ASIA Bureau)
) (T.N. these notations
were marked in the margin)

(50 13743)

SECRET -- Embassy CHO Code

(T.N. In the copy, there
are 2 stamps indicating
TOP SECRET.)

Dispatched A.M. May 21, 1941
from BERLIN.
Arrived P.M. May 21, 1941
this office.

To the Foreign Minister

from Ambassador OSHIMA

No. 575

The JAPANESE-AMERICAN Agreement now under negotiation,
is thought to be important change in the national policy,
and it concerns greatly with the plans of the JAPANESE military
and naval attaches in Germany. Therefore, recognizing the
fact that it is necessary to transmit this agreement to them
beforehand, telegrams No. 567, No. 568, and No. 569 were sent
exclusively to both attaches today, the 20th. As regards this
matter, I wish you will inform the War Minister, the Naval
Minister, the Chief of General Staff, and the Chief of the
Navy General Staff.

電傳標

(總)

那加十天年十一月二十日兩國自林發(號機)
九月二十日謝以本省署

1383B(20)

(總/13743)

外使館	食臣件號
外務大臣	

大島大使

第三十六號

營運處

郵局

歐亞局

金庫

ext 1076

御交涉中、日本傳達、重天十七國策、更下考、已於陸海軍
武官、外使、三令之諸企劃、三國保合所大十分以予之、豫傳
會、交要、下記、本于日兩武官限、命令、上旨、特傳第廿六
號、第五十八號、第五十九號、兩武官、提示也付、貴大臣引是
陸海軍大臣、參謀參長、軍令部參長、御手ノ願シ(丁)

No.2

Doc. /383B(20)

五月二十一日 大島大使館 外務大臣宛電報

第五十七號

御文書中、日米協定の宣大に國策、變更考
へり我陸海軍武官、總選二於今諸企劃、商
係ノ浙、大ナリ以テ之ヲ豫メ傳へ置キ事要アリ認
ノ本二十日兩武官限、令ミシテ往電第五十六號
第五十八號、第五十九號ヲ兩武官ニ提示セ付、
貴大臣ヨリモ陸海軍大臣參謀總長、軍令部
總長ヘ仰示し願ヒ久ニ
(了)